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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2927 
 ___________ 
 
 MICHAEL R. SHEMONSKY, Debtor, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 JOHN J. THOMAS, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02882) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 28, 2010 
 
 Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: November 5, 2010) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Shemonsky appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s June 21, 2010 order.  We will summarily affirm.  
 In June 2010, Shemonsky filed a complaint against a United States Bankruptcy 
 
 
Court Judge as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis.  In his complaint, 
Shemonsky sought over $5 billion dollars in damages for the 1990 “illegal theft of [his] 
savings and loan by the office of thrift supervision.”  The complaint, which states that the 
bases for federal jurisdiction are “Article IV of the U.S. Constitution [and the] Fifth 
Amendment,” makes no reference Judge Thomas, the defendant.  On June 21, 2010, the 
district court entered an order that granted Shemonsky’s application to proceed in forma 
pauperis but dismissed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The district 
court explained that, under the doctrine of judicial immunity, Judge Thomas is absolutely 
immune from civil rights lawsuits that seek money damages for actions performed in a 
judicial capacity.  See Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).  Additionally, the district 
court stated that Shemonsky’s action, which was filed twenty years after the alleged 
events in question occurred, was time-barred because federal civil rights actions are 
subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitation for personal injury actions.  See 
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524.  This appeal 
followed.1  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and our review of the district 
court’s sua sponte dismissal of Shemonsky’s complaint is plenary.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may take summary action when we 
                                                 
1 After Shemonsky filed his notice of appeal from the June 21, 2010 order, he 
moved for reconsideration of that order.  He attached documents from some of his 
previous cases (of which there are many), claiming that they supported his allegations 
regarding a “conspiracy to [sic] entrapment for financial gain.”  The district court denied 
the motion, stating that Shemonsky did not address the bases for the dismissal of his 
complaint.  Shemonsky did not appeal from the denial of the motion for reconsideration.  
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conclude that an appeal presents no “substantial question.”  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6.   
 After granting a litigant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a district court is 
required to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the reasons given by the district court, 
we agree that Shemonsky’s complaint failed to state a claim.    
 We have also held that a district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint 
without allowing the plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or 
futile.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Although the district court did not explicitly 
state that amendment of the complaint would be futile, it is clear that this was the district 
court’s intent.  Further, Shemonsky has had, and has taken, the opportunity to respond to 
the district court’s order, but has revealed no flaw in the dismissal of his complaint.   We 
will therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the district court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
